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IS MAN'S INFLICfiON OF 
SUFFERING ON ANIMALS IMMORAL? 
Robert Welborn 
P.O. Box 208 
Franktown, Colorado 80116 
Must not the first step in the consideration of this question be 
definition: what is moral? Websters Dictionary says it is that which is 
"conforming to generally accepted ideas of what is right and just in 
human conduct" but let us propose another definition: that conduct 
which is compassionate, rational, and vital in relation to the preserva-
tion and enhancement of life itself. 
If it is believed that man is properly in dominion over the earth 
and that he may do with it and all things on it as he will, then the 
first definition is sufficient. If generally accepted ideas in man's commu-
nity are to the effect that man's infliction of suffering on animals is 
right, then such is not immoral. 
If it is believed, however, that life, all life, as it has evolved in its 
beauty and complexity is the consideration upon which conduct should 
be judged, then the second definition must apply. Man being the domin-
ant species that consciously and by plan produces suffering or harmony, 
beauty or ugliness, can do or fail to do what is right in relation to all 
life. Of course the first definition does not rule out ideas for human 
conduct that are determined in relation to life but it does not require 
such ideas. 
If a person should put a dog in a cage and then abandon it to die 
slowly for want of food and water, it would be said that such conduct 
is immoral under both the first and second definitions. If, however, a 
person in a white coat for experimental purposes injects lye into the 
esophagus of a dog and the dog experiences pain and loneliness for 
days or weeks before death, it would be said by many that this is moral 
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under the first definition because it is generally accepted that animals 
should be used in laboratories for the benefit of mankind. (This usage 
of dogs and many other horrendously cruel usages of animals are 
reported in authentic detail by Dallas Pratt M.D. in his books: Alterna-
tives to Pain in Experiments on Animals and Painful Experiments on 
Animals. Anyone wanting to know what life is really like on this globe 
under man's dominion should read these books.) But this type of labo-
ratory use is immoral without question under the second definition. It 
is the infliction of prolonged unnatural suffering on a sentient creature, 
an abuse of life. 
The world and life on it, including man's life, will be secure from 
extinction and life will be profoundly satisfying only when the first and 
second definitions mean the same thing, when man fulfills his dominant 
and self-conscious part in the life process with compassion, reason, and 
vitality. Those who are concerned with animal welfare must strive toward 
the merging ofthe definitions so that the second is really a part of the first, 
must be imbued not just with the horror of man's cruelty to other living 
things but with the reverence for all life, its evolution and its beauty. 
One approach to this merging of the definitions is to teach, and 
hopefully bring people to the realization, that humanity's welfare is 
intertwined with the welfare of all life on this earth. This certainly is 
an approach that should be followed but it suggests an acceptance of 
the first definition alone with man's welfare still being the sole consid-
eration and with man, although broadening his purview, still determin-
ing what life serves his purpose and what does not. This selective 
evaluation would seemingly permit whatever action man conceived to 
be in his own self-interest with other life being subservient to it. The 
goal is the unity of human self-interest and the interest of all life. When 
this goal is achieved, and thus people revere all life as they revere their 
own part, there will be a merging of the definitions. (See Mary Midgley-
Animals and Why They Matter, 1984, University of Georgia Press, for 
further fine discussion.) 
The other approach to the merging is to seek moral propriety 
outside of man. It seems fundamental that if there is no value determin-
ant outside of man, if there is no God, then morals are a matter of the 
dominant expediency. (Thomas Jefferson invoked the Laws of Nature 
and Nature's God to establish the values, life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness, as against the temporal expediency that was dominant.) 
We can urge that it is expedient for people to realize that their welfare 
and the welfare of all life are interdependent. But expediency is a 
vagrant thing. It varies according to the situation; it is not the same 
from one society to the other, from one generation to the next. It simply 
teaches that that which seems to work in a particular society will be 
the determinant of the morals of that society. Assault and battery will be 
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punished because it is inimical to the peace and comfort of the society. 
The torment of animals in laboratories, in entertainment spectacles, 
and in food production procedures will not be punished because it is 
felt that these uses of animals contribute to the pleasure and comfort 
of the society, such being a proper test of propriety and morals. There 
are no universal, permanent values, only values for a particular time 
and place. 
It is, therefore, only with a consideration outside of man that 
universal values are found, the second definition made universally 
applicable and the merger of the two definitions made secure. This 
consideration is God and God is manifest in the life that has evolved 
on this earth. God is not supernatural or mystical but the essence of 
the natural, the truth of the universe and the truth of the meadowlark 
and the blade of grass. This is not the god of any particular religion 
or cult. No confined doctrine or teaching of any sect can lay claim to 
God-only life itself and man as a part of that life. 
The truth that is God is all encompassing. There is no separation 
offact and value; there is no distinction between science and compassion 
and no isolation of science from the moral sphere. Each element of 
reality, each element of life, the seen and the unseen, the known and 
the felt, the proved and the believed, is involved in and is a part of 
those values which are consummate in beauty. This is the purpose, the 
harmony and the balance, and includes the minutest part of life and 
each particle that makes up the sunset and the sea. 
Man's anthropocentrism is nowhere more evident than in the gods 
he chooses and thus those gods are basically called upon to have as 
their primary concern the salvation of man. Man mostly conceives that 
he alone of the species has a soul worthy of consideration by a divine 
being. There is no realization that man's function is fulfilled and hap-
piness achieved by serving God and that this can only be done by 
serving life and beauty which are the manifestation of God. This service 
calls for the second definition. 
People shy away when one talks about God as the universal being 
not defined by a particular doctrine. They cannot stand the broad respon-
sibility and seeming uncertainty of service to God through the preser-
vation and enhancement of life, through the inspired and rational crea-
tive process of love for that life. They want their book to tell them what 
to do. They seek refuge from the discomfort either in the dogma of some 
organized religion which teaches the propriety of man's dominion or in 
the dominion itself which they assume justifies all, without God. 
Acceptance of the second definition is the real hope for the cause 
of animal welfare, for the reduction and elimination of the suffering 
which man inflicts on other living things. Although there may seem to be 
more people aware of this suffering, the massive obstacle of indifference 
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enlarges and the number of animals used and abused each year 
increases. Without a new and true morality people will continue with 
their approval of the torture of rabbits, monkeys and calves for the 
benefit of cosmetics, science, good food and entertainment.* 
The truth that people fail to grasp is that only by respecting and 
serving all life for its own sake will they achieve for themselves mean-
ingful and satisfying lives. The callous and irrational preoccupation 
with the use of all other things on this earth, animate and inanimate, 
for present and often perverted physical comfort and gratification por-
tends certain deterioration. Man fails even to protect his own progeny 
by conservation and the reasonable use of natural resources, and fails 
to realize the happiness that would come from a compassionate and 
rational relationship with other forms of life. 
Several years ago Mortimer Adler of the Great Books program 
discussed the arguments of the humanists as against those he called 
animalists. The humanists, he said, take the position that animals do 
not have inherent dignity or inherent rights but that people might do 
moral damage to themselves by being cruel to animals, (The Great 
Ideas Tbday-1975, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.). There is no felt or 
understood awareness of the sanctity of all life, of the capacity of the 
dog or bird for pain or love or joy. Man, the tormentor and destroyer, 
is the only important thing. These humanists never saw or found the 
dignity of the cow with her calf, the hen with her chicks, the mother 
gorilla with her baby. Under their theory the covert torment of animals 
in laboratories would be acceptable because no one but the attendants 
and experimenters sees the animals, society is not exposed to the 
atrocities and thus the human race does not suffer moral damage. The 
attendants and experimenters are indifferent to the suffering of the 
animals and therefore the cruelty has no affect on them. 
A contrast to this failure to understand and be inspired by the 
significance of all life is the thought and feeling of Loren Eiseley who 
had the completeness of perception to believe and know that all life is 
sacred, from the vagrant seed drifting in the air to the violet and the 
tree frog. He spoke from the expertise of his profession, anthropology, 
and with the sensitivity of an Emily Dickinson. From personal experi-
ence he told of the capacity of the hawk and the fox for pain and love 
and joy. For him there was companionship and familial oneness with 
this hawk and this fox and with the bittern in whose life there was a 
fundamental element like an element in his own. (See Loren Eiseley's 
*This is a reference to the United States government-sanctioned Draize test in which 
the substance to be tested is placed in the eye of a live conscious rabbit to see how long 
it takes to cause irreparable damage to the eye; to the misery of primates restrained in 
vice-like chairs for endless days of psychological or surgical experiments; to the confine-
ment of veal calves in boxes; and to the brutal torment of calves and steers in roping 
contests at rodeos or practice arenas. 
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The Star Thrower, a collection of essays and Another Kind of Autumn, 
a collection of poems.) 
The insensitive rationalization that only man has dignity or rights 
underlies the first definition and that definition is predominant. How 
then do we effectively invoke morality in our presentations to those 
people who could do something for animal welfare-by legislation, by 
teaching, or by direct action? We unequivocally assert the second defini-
tion. We sustain it affirmatively by the perception of people of science 
such as Loren Eiseley. We sustain it negatively by the teaching of 
authorities such as Jonathan Schell and Paul and Anne Ehrlich. 
(Jonathan Schell's Reflections on The Fate of the Earth received wide 
recognition when they first appeared in The New Yorker in 1982. The 
Ehrlichs' book entitled Extinction deals with just that.) This is the 
perception and this is the teaching that man may well be in the process 
of ending life on this earth, either abruptly or gradually. 
Some may question the relevance of this reference to the extinction 
oflife in a paper dealing with the subject of animal welfare. It may be said 
that man can determine what life forms continue and what do not and that 
whether or not living things suffer at the hands of man is irrelevant to the 
question of survival. But this is precisely the danger-man's assumption 
that he can be the determinant of life. Man has failed completely in 
this regard and this establishes that only a respect for all life will unify 
humanity and carry it through the destructive forces it has created. 
This respect is the basis for the second definition, a moral standard 
existing outside of man. One cannot respect life and permit its torment. 
This is fundamental. The infliction of suffering is by definition immoral. 
Let us not hesitate to urge this morality on all persons to whom 
supplication is made for animal welfare. There will be deaf ears and 
bored expressions but this is our only hope for man's proper relationship 
with animals and for the balance and development of life itself. Unless 
the humane treatment of animals is made a part of the most basic and 
affirmative moral considerations, it will continue to be treated by the 
lawmakers and the teachers and by society in general as a minor matter 
in relation to what man conceives to be his major concerns and desires. 
Through the process of evolution and refinement man has come to 
have the capacity for compassion and reason, the two attributes that 
must be constantly combined, and to have the power of domination. 
This capacity and this power make possible the responsible custodian-
ship of the earth and all life on it. If the capacity is unused, the power 
becomes the devolutionary force it is today and all life suffers. 
What are the responsibilities of this custodianship? They are to 
conserve and nurture the earth's natural resources, the minerals, the 
vegetation, the soils, the contours, the air and the water so that they 
are an ever-present source of life and beauty; and they are to protect 
and care for those animals that are under or affected by man's dominion 
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so that they will have lives no less vital than in natural conditions with 
suffering minimized as much as humanly possible. 
Suffering is a fact of life. Man cannot eliminate it for himself or for 
other creatures. But the suffering imposed by man on other living things 
is different in kind from the suffering of animals in nature. With man 
animals are in an alien world; with nature they are in their own environ-
ment. Man need not and should not interfere with the natural environ-
ment, even in an attempt to alleviate natural suffering. His function is to 
deal with the suffering he creates. This he can control and prevent. 
The moral charge to man is to have the same fervor and diligence 
for the preclusion of animal suffering that he has for the preclusion of 
his own. The implementation of this charge must be accomplished by 
laws and standards as detailed as those man has conceived for his own 
governance, realizing that different laws and standards would be appro-
priate in many respects for different species or different conditions of 
particular animals. For example, these laws or standards would require 
that laboratory animals live in comfortable, non-stressful conditions 
and be protected from pain by anesthetics, analgesics or other approp-
riate care, with the elimination of the use of animals in laboratories 
as the ultimate requirement; they would deal with the care and humane 
raising, handling, transportation, and slaughter of animals used for 
food; and they would preclude the use of animals for or in connection 
with entertainment if such use would cause stress or pain. 
Surely all of this responsibility involves something very affirmative, 
not the passive approach of those who feel only that cruelty to animals 
might be bad for human morals nor the approach that relies on sensitizing 
people and making them feel uncomfortable about cruelty, however 
commendable such an approach might be. This affirmative responsibility 
involves man leading himself into the inspired, rational, and vital state 
of being in which there is respect, and indeed reverence, for all life with 
man's life being relevant as a part of the whole. Only this completely 
positive way will preclude extinction and bring balance, harmony, and 
constructive relationships among all living things. This then is the 
morality, some may call it religion, for animal welfare because it is the 
morality for all life, including man's. 
Perhaps those professors of human and divine morality who speak 
from temple and mosque, from synagogue and church could be per-
suaded that all life is involved in the constitution of morality and in 
morality's purview and protection. Perhaps those people who are moved 
to tears by Bach's great Saint Matthew Passion as it profoundly sings 
of the suffering of a great human being can be moved to tears by the 
suffering of the dog and the calf as they are tormented by human 
cruelty. Because this is the hope: the uniting and the unity of those 
passions which make up the religious, the music and the humanitarian 
experience in compassion for life itself. 
